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Abstract. The aim of this paper is to contribute to the debate about the electoral rules in Italy. 
In particular, we simulate some voting rules to test what is the best electoral system on the 
basis of a utility function that takes into account two indices – representativeness and 
governability. As long as governability is important, a mixed member system (75% plurality, 
25% proportional representation) outperforms the others. Our tool is the software ALEX4.1.  
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1.  Introduction 
In the last twenty years the issue of institutional reforms has played an important role 
in the Italian political debate (Padovano and Ricciuti, 2008). The Executive and the 
Parliament did not see their structure and relevant powers changed, but changes in the voting 
rule took place. The Parliament is bicameral: the Camera dei Deputati – the Lower Chamber 
– has 630 legislators elected by all citizens over eighteen years old, while the Senato – the 
Upper Chamber – has 315 legislators elected by voters over twenty-five years old.
1 Both 
houses share exactly the same power. The electoral system changed once in 46 years,
2 and 
since then has changed twice in 13 years. From 1948 to 1993 the Lower Chamber was elected 
in relatively large multi member districts by proportional representation (PR) with D’Hondt 
rule. The Upper Chamber was elected on the basis of small constituencies but seats were 
assigned proportionally according to the regional results. Since this system provided rather 
unstable governments, in 1993 a referendum was called to transform the Upper House voting 
rule to first-past-the-post for 258 over 315 seats. The referendum achieved 82.7% of votes in 
favour of the change, and subsequently the Parliament passed a bill stating that 75% of the 
seats of the Lower Chamber had to be elected with the first-pass-the-post system in single – 
member districts, while the remaining 25% had to be elected on the basis of nationwide 
proportional representation with a 4% threshold. For the Upper House no competing lists 
were considered, but still there was a mechanism aimed at reducing the effects of plurality. 
In 2005 the electoral system was changed again and the current voting rule was 
applied. The coalition of lists obtaining the majority of votes receives at least 55% of the seats 
in the Lower Chamber, and there is a 2% threshold. In the Upper Chamber 55% of seats is 
given at the regional level. This system has been widely criticised: it tends to increase the 
number of parties, and therefore, political fragmentation with negative effects on government 
stability. Furthermore, lists are closed.
3 In light of this criticism, the political arena is 
currently discussing several proposals to further reform the electoral rules.  
                                                 
1 Former Presidents of the Republic are also de jure members of the Senato, and the President of the Republic 
can appoint five life Senators. 
2 In 1953 a law giving 65% of seats to the coalition obtaining 50.1% of votes passed, but did not become 
effective since Christian Democrats and its allies did not overcome that threshold. The law was abolished in 
1954.  
3 At the time of writing this paper signatures were collected to call for three referendums aimed at changing the 
law. The first and the second give 55% of seats to the list obtaining the majority of votes at the Camera and 
Senato, respectively. The third prevents candidature in more than one district.   2
In this paper we use the software ALEX4.1 (Bissey and Ortona, 2007) to simulate the 
effects of a number of possible reforms on political representation, on the basis of the results 
of the 2006 elections. In particular, we focus on first-past-the-post (FPTP), proportional 
representation (PR), run-off, mixed plurality-proportional representation (MM1 and MM2), 
PR with several thresholds, PR with small districts.
4 For simplicity, we concentrate on the 
Camera dei Deputati. 
The paper is organised as follows: section 2 is devoted to the description of the data 
and the hypotheses we base our simulations on. The simulated voting rules are discussed in 
section 3. Results are presented in section 4. Section 5 is dedicated to a brief discussion about 
Condorcet and Borda. A comparison of possible reforms with the current voting rule is 
outlined in section 6. Section 7 concludes. An appendix gives some details on the parties and 
a summary of the Italian electoral system over time. 
 
                                                 
4 We are aware of some limitations of this work. First, different voting rules change the supply of parties, since 
they change their incentives. Second, the electoral results of 2006 general elections are a picture of the past: 
preferences may have changed, and also the political geography has changed somewhat. For example, RnP, the 
alliance between SDI and Radical Party, no longer exists; Ulivo was an electoral agreement between Ds and 
Margherita, and is now becoming the Partito Democratico (Democratic Party); a number of MPs seceded from 
DS to create a new party called Sinistra Democratica per il Socialismo (Democratic Left for Socialism).   3
2.  Hypotheses and Data  
ALEX4.1 requires a number of inputs:
5 
a) The number of voters in each constituency (100); 
b) The size of the Parliament (630, as for real); 
c) The number of parties (9); 
d) The nation-wide share of votes of each party; 
e) The probability that the second preferred party is next to the first preferred on the left-right 
axis (0.8, the default value), and the probability that it is a second next party (0.1 by default). 
These probabilities are employed to provide the full ordering of preferences
6 for parties of 
every voter, through a random-number device; 
f) The location of each party on the left-to-right axis; 
g) The concentration of parties – if it is the case.  
Table 1 shows the main data we use in our simulations. In column (1) we report the 
votes obtained in the 2006 general elections, with some rearrangements: we sum two far left 
parties (RC and Pdci), two centrist parties belonging to the centre-left coalition (Udeur and 
IdV), and two centrist parties belonging to the centre-right coalition (UDC and DC) in order 
to simplify the computations. In column (2) we measure the ideological distance on a left-to-
right scale in the range 1-100.
7 Column (3) and (4) are concerned with party concentration 
and the number of constituencies in which each party is concentrated. We assume that a party 
is concentrated in a constituency if the share of votes for that party is at least 1.2 times the 















where  = d i, ϑ number of seats of party i in the concentrated constituency d;  = d i, θ electoral 
result of the party i in the constituency d divided by the national electoral result. The number 
of seats where the party is concentrated is equal to: 
                                                 
5 In brackets, the figures assumed here. 
6 We need them to simulate Borda Count and Condorcet Winner. 
7 Data come from a re-arrengment of the “expert survey” by Benoit and Laver (mimeo). This survey replicates 
the methodology used in Benoit and Laver (2006). We are grateful to the authors for the permission to use it.   4
 
 n =  ∑ d i, 3
2
ϑ    (2) 
 
We consider the value 2/3 because ALEX4.1 only allows for one concentrated party in each 
district. The sum of districts where parties are concentrated would be more than 900. Through 
(2) we reduce this number to 614 ( 630 < ). 
 
Table 1. Basic data 
  % votes in 2006  D c    N
RC+Pdci 8.4  10 1.35  58
Verdi 2.2  17 1.53  50
Ulivo 33.0  34 1.38  62
RnP 2.7  38 1.52  35
Udeur+IdV 3.8  48 1.72  158
UDC+DC 7.8  60 1.45  46
FI 24.5  74 1.30  17
AN 12.8  81 1.44  46
LN 4.8  86 2.22  142
 
 
On the basis of basic data reported in Table 1, we simulate different electoral systems 
and evaluate each voting rule by means of two indices – representativeness and governability. 
Representativeness is defined as the distance with the respect to the one-district PR system – a 
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where Sij is the number of seats obtained by party i with the voting system j, Spp,i is the 
number of seats obtained by party i under one-district PR, Su,i is the number of seats that party 
i has in case of maximum disproportionality (i.e., the case in which the largest party in the 
one-district PR gets all the seats). 
Governability is based on the number of crucial parties (i.e., those who would destroy 
the government majority if they withdrew), and on the number of seats of the majority. It is 
given by:   5
 
Gj = A + B             ( 4 )  
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B ,  where n is the number of seats above the majority level
8, m is 
the total number of seats, and C is the total number of crucial parties. 
How to use these indices to compare the performance of different systems? When a 
system is either dominant among a set of systems (i.e. it enjoys the highest levels of both 
representativeness and governability), or dominated by one of them, the solution is trivial. 
The former is the best system while the latter is ruled out. When a trade-off between the two 
dimensions arises, we have to establish a criterion to decide which one is the most relevant. A 
possible solution is to introduce a social utility function: 
b aR G U =   (5)   
where  G = index of governability and R = index of representativeness. The relative 
importance of the two main dimensions is represented by the ratio a/b.
9 When its value is 
higher than 1, governability is more relevant than representativeness and vice versa. 
Obviously, the system with the highest value of U is the best one.
10  
 
                                                 
8 Half the number of seats plus one if the number of seats is even; half the number of seats plus 0.5 if it is odd. 
9 Actually, the ratio of partial elasticities may be considered a proxy for the relative weight that the community 
assigns to relative increase in the value of G and R.. This is the main reason to choose a Cobb-Douglas form. See 
Fragnelli et al. (2005) for a broader discussion. 
10 For a further discussion and some empirical applications, see Ortona et al. (2008).   6
3.  The simulated electoral systems 
In this section we analyse what would have happened under different electoral 
systems. In particular, we simulate the Italian Parliament under: 
1)  One–District Proportionality – the voting rule used in The Netherlands (but for minor 
differences), used as a reference to compare the other systems; 
2)  Runoff majority – the voting rule used in France (again, minor differences apart); 
3)  First–Past–the–Post – the voting rule used in UK; 
4)  Mixed Member I (without subtraction) – a combination of the First–Past–the–Post system 
and proportional representation. In our simulation we assign 25% of the seats through 
proportionality and 75% through plurality; 
5)  Mixed Member II (with subtraction) – a proxy of the Italian electoral system from 1993 to 
2005. Again in this case 25% of the seats are assigned through proportionality and 75% 
through plurality, but the number of votes needed to elect one MP in the First-Past-the-Post 
part is subtracted from the lists in the PR part, making the voting rule more proportional. 
For First–Past–the–Post, Mixed Member I and Mixed Member II we consider the 
possibility of strategic voting: most voters whose preferred party has no chance of winning 
will probably either abstain or vote for the second (third, etc.) preferred party. Hence what 
must be introduced is the possibility for the voter either to vote for a would-be winner or to 
vote for the preferred party. This is done through a probability, p. If the probability is 0, the 
voter will remain faithful to its preferred party; if it is 1, s/he will vote for the largest party of 
the coalition that party belongs to, also to be defined by the user. If 0 < p < 1, the value of p is 
used to produce the choices of every voter, through a random-number device. Accordingly,  p 
is computed as: 
 
p = 1-kD / 1 0 0                  ( 6 )  
 
where 0 ≤ D ≤ 100 is the distance between the preferred party and the largest party of the 
coalition (values are obtained from the ideological distance in Table 1), and k is a weighting 
parameter. We consider two values of k, 0 (which maximises strategic voting) and 5, which 
makes a modest strategic voting.
11   
6)  Threshold Proportionality In our simulations threshold is fixed at 3%, 4%,  or 5%  (the 
voting rule used in Germany); 
                                                 
11 Simulations with higher values of k did not produce substantially different results.    7
7)  Proportional Representation with small districts – the voting rule used in Spain. In recent 
months the Spanish system has gained some support as a possible voting rule reform. 
Typically, the Spanish system is based on small districts, which make the competition centred 
upon the two main parties, or strong regional parties. The number of representatives per 
district ranges from 1 to 34, with an average of 7. The few large districts allow some 
representation for small non regional parties. According to Rae and Ramírez (1993), “The 
system regulates the competition among parties in order to allow for the continuity of the 
opposition, it leaves room for to multiple voices in the Parliament and, however, it provides 
the strongest national party with the opportunity to govern and have to answer for its actions 
before the electorate”. ALEX4.1 does not allow for districts of different magnitude. 
Therefore, we run three simulations with 5, 7 and 10 representatives per district in order to 
mimic the Spanish system. 
   8
4.  Results 
In this section we report the results obtained through the simulations. To help reading 
the tables we draw a dotted line between the centre-left and the centre-right coalitions. Tables 
also report the indices of G and R for each parliament.  
Table 2 reports the results of one-district PR, Run-off and First-Past-the-Post. We can 
notice that plurality strongly polarises political representation. Under maximum strategic 
voting (k = 0) the centre-right gets a small majority, whereas when we reduce the level of 
strategic voting (k = 5) the same coalition gets a large majority. FI can even support the 
government alone, and this gives a large G. The run-off also strongly reduces the number of 
parties in the Parliament, with the centre-right coalition obtaining a small majority.  
Results for the two majoritarian systems are compared with one-district PR. Clearly, 
all parties are represented in this Parliament, at the expense of the main ones. By definition R 
is equal to one, and governability is quite low, because the resulting centre-left government 
has only a majority seat.  
 
Table 2. One-district Proportionality, Runoff Majority and FPTP with strategic voting 
 One-district 
Proportionality 
Runoff Majority First Past the Post 
k = 0
First Past the Post 
k = 5
RC+Pdci 53 1 1 0
Verdi 14  0 0 0
Ulivo 208  299 307 236
RnP 17  0 0 0
Udeur+IdV 24  0 0 0
UDC+DC 49  3 7 0
FI 154  287 271 347
AN 81  40 44 47
LN 30  0 0 0
R 1  0.469 0.488 0.476











In Table 3 we present results for the two mixed systems. In these two systems the 
centre–right coalition always wins the elections. As in the First-Past-the-Post scenario, a 
decrease in the level of strategic voting leads to a rise in the seats for FI and a reduction for 
Ulivo. This is due to the fact that FI is near to AN and not so far from UDC + DC and LN, 
while Ulivo is far from RC + PdCI. 
 
   9
 
Table 3. Mixed Member I and II with strategic voting (75% FPTP, 25% PR) 
  Mixed Member I 
k = 0 
Mixed Member I 
k = 5 
Mixed Member II 
k = 0 
Mixed Member II 
k = 5
RC+Pdci  14 13 2 19
Verdi  4 4 0 4
Ulivo  282 229 304 231
RnP  4 4 0 2
Udeur+IdV  6 6 0 6
UDC+DC  17 12 6 14
FI  242 298 279 300
AN  53 56 39 48
LN  8 8 0 6
R  0.616 0.609 0.476 0.600











Table 4 reports the results for simulations of the PR system with some thresholds. The 
results are quite different as long as the thresholds change. For example, with the three 
percent threshold, all parties but two are represented in the Parliament, with the five percent 
threshold only five parties get representatives. Representativeness is always quite high, and 
governability increases with higher thresholds.  
 
Table 4. Threshold Proportionality 
 3% 4% 5%
RC+Pdci 55 58 61
V e r d i  000
Ulivo 219 228 241
R n P  000
Udeur+IdV 25 0 0
UDC+DC 52 54 57
FI 162 169 179
AN 85 88 93
LN 32 33 0
R 0.927 0.869 0.797









Table 5 reports the results we obtained  mimicking  the Spanish system. The system 
gives a clear advantage to the two main parties. Moving from 5 to 10 representatives this edge 
is reduced, and almost all parties receive some representation. Note that a strongly regional 
base such as LN sees the number of its MPs reduced as long as the district magnitude   10
increases. The opposite happens for parties that are more homogeneously represented, such as 
UDC+DC and RC+Pdci. Representativeness is quite high, but governability is not: although 
the main parties are very large, they still need to make alliances in order to make a 
government. The centre-right coalition prevails with the lowest district magnitude, whereas 
the centre-left will govern under the two other simulations (only by one vote with 7 MPs 
district magnitude).  
 
Table 5. Proportional Representation with small districts 
  5 MPs 7 MPs 10 MPs
RC+Pdci 12 19 48
V e r d i  000
Ulivo 283 288 258
R n P  000
Udeur+IdV 0 9 16
U D C + D C  91 23 4
FI 218 192 189
AN 84 90 71
LN 24 20 14
R 0.664 0.699 0.799









Which is the best system? We consider two different scenarios – the case where 
citizens use the maximum level of strategic voting (k = 0) and the case where voters use a 
lower level of strategic voting (k = 5). 
In the first scenario, according to our indices of G and R, First-Past-the-Post, Mixed 
Member I and Proportional with 7 small districts are always dominated by other systems. The 
situation is really different in the second scenario (k = 5). According to our indices G and R, 
Runoff Majority, Mixed Member II and Proportional with 7 small districts are always 
dominated by other systems. We compare the goodness of the non remaining systems through 
the utility function (5). From section 2, we know that the choice of the best electoral system 
depends on the value of the ratio a/b. Results are reported in Table 6. These results can be 
easily interpreted considering the trade-off between representativeness: for small values of a 
(the weight of governability in equation 5), the best system is the one that gives an almost 1:1 
relationship between votes and seats (one-district proportionality). As long as a increases with 
respect to b, preference is given to less representative systems. When governability clearly   11
outweighs representativeness, runoff majority and FPTP prevail. Given a less than perfect 
strategic voting, the Mixed Member I seems the best electoral system.        12
Table 6. Choice of the best system I 
a/b  Preferred System 
k = 0 
< 0.404  One–District Proportionality 
() 666 . 0 ; 404 . 0 ∈   Proportional with 3% threshold 
() 776 . 1 ; 666 . 0 ∈   Proportional with 5% threshold 
> 1.776  Runoff Majority 
k = 5 
< 0.392  One–District Proportionality 
() 673 . 4 ; 392 . 0 ∈   Mixed Member I 
> 4.673  First-Past-the-Post 
 
   13
5.  A comparison with the current electoral system 
It is interesting to compare the current system (proportional with majority top-up for 
the coalition that obtains the largest number of votes) with possible other voting rules. Table 7 
reports the distribution of seats after the 2006 general election, and provides the indices we 
have calculated for the other voting rules. In Table 8 we select the best electoral system on the 
basis of the ratio a/b. In our simulation, the current system performs quite well under pure 
strategic voting, but just a small deviation from it shows that if governability is considered 
important, then Mixed Member I prevails again. This can at least partially explain why this 
system is so criticised. For extreme weight of governability the First-Past-the-Post succeeds.  
 

















Table 8. Choice of the best system II 
a/b  Preferred System 
k = 0 
< 0.139  One–District Proportionality 
> 0.139  PR with majority top-up 
k = 5 
< 0.139  One–District Proportionality 
() 75 . 0 , 139 . 0 ∈   PR with majority top-up 
() 673 . 4 , 75 . 0 ∈   Mixed Member I 
> 4.673  First-Past-the-Post 
 
   14
6.  A discussion on Condorcet Winner and Borda Count 
 
This section is devoted to the results from two famous electoral systems that can be 
simulated using ALEX4.1: Condorcet Winner and Borda Count.
12 Their relevance for 
theoretical issues makes it worthwhile deserving a section to them.   
Both Borda Count and Condorcet Winner require the full ordering of preferences for 
parties of every voter. ALEX4.1 provides it through a random-number device by using the 
probability that the second preferred party is next to the first preferred on the left-right axis 
and the probability that it is a second next party – set at the beginning by the user. 
In our simulation (Table 9) Borda Count assigns a very large number of seats to 
UDEUR and IdV. This is due to the fact that this is a consensus-based rather than a 
majoritarian electoral system. This implies that, as in our scenario, it may result into the 
election of a broadly acceptable but not preferred party. In Condorcet Winner, the importance 
of the central party is reduced with respect to Borda, while the number of seats for large 
parties increases. 
If we add Condorcet Winner and Borda Count parameters to choose the best electoral 
system (Table 10), we find out that the latter performs better than the actual system if 
governability becomes relevant when voters act fully strategically and it crowds out First-
Past-the-Post when k = 5. On the other hand, Condorcet Winner is never the preferred system. 
 
                                                 
12 According to Borda Count each voter is asked to rank the list of parties. For each party is assigned 1 
point to the first preferred party, 2 points to the second party and so on. The points obtained by each party are 
summed up for each district. The winner is the party with the smallest sum. Condorcet Winner is the party that is 
preferred by the majority when confronted in pairs to all the other parties. Then, if we have this scenario, the 
assignment of the seat is straightforward. If we have a cycle, the winner is the party with the highest number of 
vote in the district.   15













Majority  Centre-Left (417) Centre-Left (461)
 
Table 10. Choice of the best system III 
a/b  Preferred System 
k = 0 
< 0.139  One–District Proportionality 
() 609 . 1 , 139 . 0 ∈   PR with majority top-up 
> 1.609  Borda Count 
k = 5 
< 0.139  One–District Proportionality 
() 75 . 0 , 139 . 0 ∈   PR with majority top-up 
() 754 . 3 , 75 . 0 ∈   Mixed Member I 
> 3.754  Borda Count 
 
   16
7.  Conclusions 
This paper provides a set of simulations for the Italian electoral system that could be 
useful for the current debate. First, we show that there is not a system that dominates the 
others. The choice about the best electoral system depends on the preferences about the two 
dimensions we considered – representativeness and governability. Second, we find that as 
long as governability is more important than representativeness, the Mixed Member I tends to 
prevail. Interestingly, the centre-right tends to win more often than the centre-left, although in 
the 2006 election the centre-left won by a tiny majority. This can be caused by at least two 
reasons: first, the ideological distance between the parties that constitute the centre-left 
coalition is higher than among those of the centre-right, and under non perfect strategic voting 
this will mean that a higher percentage of centre-left voters would abstain or vote non-
strategically.
13 Second, the centre-left coalition is constituted by a very large party (Ulivo) 
and smaller allies, and these small parties are often unable to get represented under alternative 
voting rules. A reorganisation of the centre-left coalition seems therefore needed.
                                                 
13 Abstension is not contemplated in the program.   17
APPENDIX A1 - PARTIES 
The Italian political system is centred around two coalitions: centre-right (including AN, FI, 
LN, UDC+DC) and centre-left (Udeur+IdV, RnP, Verdi, Ulivo, RC+Pdci). 
 
AN: Alleanza Nazionale (National Alliance) 
FI: Forza Italia (Go Italy!) 
LN: Lega Nord (Northern League) 
UDC+DC: Unione Democratica Cristiana + Democrazia Cristiana 
Udeur+IdV: Unione democratica per l’Europa + Italia dei Valori 
RnP: Rosa nel Pugno (Rose in the Fist). Is the alliance between SDI (Italian Socialists and 
Democrats) and Italian Radicals. 
Verdi: (Green Party) 
Ulivo: Olive Tree (alliance between DS – Democrats of the Left – and DL – Democracy is 
Freedom) 
RC+Pdci: Rifondazione comunista + Partito dei comunisti italiani (Communist Refoundation 
and Italian Communists’ Party) 
 
 
APPENDIX A2 - THE ITALIAN ELECTORAL SYSTEM OVER TIME 
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majority top-up (55%)  18
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